1 The examples that could be cited here are myriad. Particularly ironic among the illustrious list of those who see Kant as a dualist are those whose attempt to defend an account of the embodied mind could have been significantly buttressed by recognizing that Kant can be read in a very different way. One of the best examples of this subgroup is the book by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought (New York: Basic Books, 1999) . For a critique of their approach, see my book review in Journal of Scientific Exploration 24.2 (Summer 2010), pp. 323-327. 2 This use of the term -folk psychology‖ assumes that the commonsense understanding of the causal role of mental states is similar to other folk theories that have appeared to be self-evident, until hard scientific evidence demonstrated otherwise. For example, folk cosmology claimed that the earth is flat and that the sun revolves around it, until Copernicus' alternative theory gained empirical confirmation. Proponents of EM cite various examples of folk theories that have been debunked. See for example, Patricia S. Churchland, Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Theory of the Mind-Brain (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1986), pp.290,300-301. She defines a -folk theory‖ in general as an -intuitive framework‖ for understanding some aspect of our human experience (p.288).
will be reducible to brain science, so that references to our -desires‖ and -beliefs‖ will have no more literal truth than references to the sun -rising‖ over the eastern horizon of the earth. In short, the core prediction of EM is that the human brain is smarter than it is complicated. 3 Among the many empirical facts cited to support EM is that the human mind-brain enables us to perform many highly complex tasks without the involvement of a conscious -ego‖ directing its processes. While examples of such facts could be taken from a wide variety of common human experiences, from speaking to the mechanics of walking or driving a car, an example that is particularly relevant in philosophical circles is given in a recent magazine article detailing the life and thought of the contemporary British philosopher, Derek Parfit. The author describes Parfit's normal approach to writing as follows:
He doesn't believe that his conscious mind is responsible for the important parts of his work.
He pictures his thinking self as a government minister sitting behind a large desk, who writes a question on a piece of paper and puts it in his out-tray. The minister then sits idly at the desk, twiddling his thumbs, while in some back room civil servants labor furiously, come up with the answer, and place it in his in-tray. 4 While perhaps not everyone has the good fortune to be able to come up with creative philosophical ideas in this way, we do all deal with a wide variety of other complex tasks in much the same way, hardly giving a single (conscious) thought to what we are doing. How is this possible? If EM is correct, the answer lies solely in the workings of the brain: we will eventually realize that such examples describe the norm, not an exception, because even the ego is actually one of the "civil servants" whose tasks collectively constitute the human brain.
3 Churchland, Neurophilosophy, p.316; she readily admits, however, that -the brain…may be more complicated than it is smart‖ (p.374). 4 Larissa MacFarquhar, -How to be Good‖, The New Yorker, September 5, 2011, pp.42-53 ; quote from p.44. Almost as if she were attempting to account for this biographical description of creative thinking, Churchland describes the brain (in Neurophilosophy, p.407) as consisting of -suitably orchestrated throngs of stupid things‖, observing that -it seems quite shocking that one's cleverness should be the outcome of well-orchestrated stupidity.‖ Churchland (and EM in general) claims this requires us to unlearn our belief in a controlling -self‖ (p.407). However, these very insights regarding the workings of the brain might point not to complete eradication of the human self, but to its redefinition, in much the same way that Jung attempted to replace Freud's conviction, that the conscious -ego‖ ought to be in control of one's mental life, with the new conviction that the path to genuine psychological health is the ability to trust in our awareness of a -Self‖ that is greater than any conscious -ego‖. On the interpretation of Kant that I shall present below, this higher -Self‖ could be identified with the body. Neuroscience will begin to dovetail nicely with philosophy when it recognizes that wisdom comes to us once we recognize that the brain itself trusts the body for virtually all of its functioning, just as Jung says the ego must trust the Self-archetype. formalized the perspectival approach and extended it to Kant's entire Critical System, arguing that Kant's ultimate goal in philosophizing was to articulate an idea of human nature as a unified whole.
In that work, however, I did not provide a detailed explanation of how Kant's new, perspectival approach transcends Cartesian dualism. Not unlike the charge often leveled against EM, Kant appears to be changing the subject of philosophy so radically that he often simply ignores the old mind-body problem. Fortunately, 1993 also saw the publication of Alison Laywine's 5 Given this more modest (but perhaps still overly ambitious) goal, I do not know whether my argument will fulfill or disappoint the presumed expectations of the conference organizers, mentioned in the opening paragraph. I suspect that, despite my best efforts to argue otherwise, proponents of EM might respond in the end that all I have done is to confirm their suspicions that Kant was a dualist after all. Again, my purpose here will be not be so grand as to claim that Kant himself was a confirmed physicalist, explicitly defending mind-brain identity. This would be too extreme, given his consistent use of language that appears to assume that mental states are in some sense real. Rather, more modestly, my purpose will be to explore whether Kant's mature Critical philosophy is consistent with mind-body identity, and whether Kant has any insights that might challenge those who affirm an extreme form of EM to correct potential defects in their own philosophy of mind. While this quotation on its own is not enough to demonstrate that by 1766 Kant had shaken off the cloak of dualism, it does provide some crucial inspiration for the view I shall support here; in any case, it demonstrates that at this point in his life, during his early 40s, he explicitly identified any thought of himself as having first and foremost (if not entirely) a physical reference-to his fingers and feet as well as to his head and heart.
II. Kant on the Brain in Dreams of a Spirit Seer
Without further elaboration and interpretation, the foregoing passage presents admittedly thin evidence for an anti-dualist position, especially since Kant seems to affirm that his -soul‖ consists of an -indivisible ‗I'‖ that might be metaphysically distinct from the body. Nevertheless, he is here identifying his awareness of that -I‖ with his awareness of his body and explicitly states that the -I‖ itself might be a product of merely -imaginary inferences‖-a position tantalizingly consistent with EM. Taking this hint as a starting-point, I shall argue that, far from being simply a further development of Cartesian dualism, Kant's Copernican revolution in philosophy advances an alternative to any form of mind-body dualism by demonstrating that, from the point of view of any legitimate natural science, I just am my body.
In the course of defending this radical position, however, Kant also argued that there is one and only one way to defend it consistently, and that is to recognize that, out of this very body that is me arise forms of knowledge whose validity is entirely independent of my physical nature. This position does not make Kant a dualist, nor even an epiphenomenalist, provided we keep in mind the perspectival character of his philosophy: although these special, -transcendental‖ forms of knowledge are all-important from one perspective (the one that matters most to philosophy), from 16 Kant, Dreams, pp.324-325 (all but the second emphasis added).
another perspective (the one that matters most to science) they are imaginary ideas that paradoxically cannot be said to exist at all! This is why Kant calls them both -transcendental‖ and -ideal‖: we must assume them, for they are the source of all meaning, yet their necessity and universality have no empirical grounding. Because we need these forms in order to explain what we know, I suggest we call this aspect of his position -explanatory idealism‖. To unpack the perplexing implications of Kant's two-sided position, we must move beyond his pre-Copernican period and examine the key features of the Critique of Pure Reason.
III. Kant's Perspectival Alternative to Cartesian Dualism
Kant begins the Preface to the first edition of the first Critique with the tantalizing claim that human reason is inevitably caught up in a highly problematic way of thinking: one that it cannot dispense with, even though it is entirely groundless as a description of empirical reality. He identifies this system of thinking as -metaphysics‖, saying the goal of his book will be to examine the powers and limits of human reason, thus enabling the reader at least to be aware of the illusory nature of traditional metaphysical ideas, even though their effects on our thinking will remain in place. I can here only briefly outline Kant's critical philosophy of mind, highlighting those features that most clearly demonstrate its monistic emphasis. As we shall see, the illusion Kant unveils is remarkably similar to the illusion EM predicts will someday be dispelled: that what we have become accustomed to calling our -mind‖ is something separate or distinct from our body.
In the first Critique's first major section, the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant famously (or on most accounts, infamously) argues that space and time are not to be viewed as absolute containers (173), understood now as a person's -bodily grasp on the field of possible spatio-temporal relations that we have by virtue of being an embodied creature.‖ In Kant's theory -the relation of the given to the larger spatial frame‖ is transformed from a secondary feature of our experience to the primary issue of philosophical interest (p.174); this is a form of idealism because -the whole of space‖ is now regarded as -relative to our perspective‖-i.e., to our -representational system‖ (p.178). Along these lines, Kant argues in the first Critique (A26/B42) that -we can accordingly speak of space, extended beings, and so on, only from the human standpoint.‖ Kant's primary concern is not with the concept of space (as claimed by those such as Allison and Falkenstein, who see the emphasis of Kant's argument as primarily psychological), but with how our -representation of space‖ (p.176) serves -as the ground of all concrete spatial determinations‖. -A priori intuition precedes psychology, because it is the frame in which all possible experience -even psychological experience -emerges.‖ (p.177) This -framing of all possible experience‖ (p.177) is -an ideal projection tied to the formal structure of our perspective‖. The common assumption -that the form of inner intuition is identical to the flow of empirical consciousness results in multiple contradictions within Kant's text.‖ (p.180) Instead, -Kant is describing something like a general, indeterminate temporal background to events‖ (p.180)-both inner (so-called -mental‖) and outer (so-called -physical‖) events. The key factor defining this background-namely -successiveness‖--emerges from our capacity for self-movement… In other words, time also emerges from a bodily foundation.‖ Kant's repeated references to time as being like -a line that is infinitely progressing…in space‖ (p.181) are also grounded in -the feeling of our own possible movement along an axis of the body.‖ Rukgaber finds the same view operating in Kant's Opus Postumum (p.183), which also depicts -a priori intuition [as] the way in which the active body projects a structured, intuitional, spatio-temporal background against which objects emerge.‖ In this final (unfinished) work, Kant was to some extent responding to Schelling (p.184), in the sense that he posits -a deep connection between the materiality of the subject and the materiality of nature. The implications of this bodily grounding of all mental functioning can be traced throughout virtually every step of Kant's theoretical system. In the next main section of the first Critique, the Transcendental Analytic of Concepts, Kant appeals to the human imagination as the power that enables us to form concepts out of the raw material presented to us by what he calls -the manifold of intuition‖-i.e., the unorganized content that is the pre-conscious predecessor of our conscious perceptions. If we keep in mind that this -manifold‖ refers to our bodily functioning, then Kant's arguments take on a distinctly anti-Cartesian flavor. In the first edition, Kant describes the following three-step process (A94): -(1) the synopsis of the manifold a priori through sense; (2) 23 Kant refers to perceptual illusions on several occasions; see e.g., B69-70, A295/B351-352, A297/B353-354. At one point, he explicitly states that the situation regarding inner sense and outer sense is -exactly the same‖ (B67); tr. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). That his discussion of the senses is meant to be understood as a discussion of the body is implied in numerous passages, such as when he describes -a representation of sense‖ as a -force of nature‖ (A294/B350). In direct opposition to Descartes, he insists that -the senses do not err‖ (A293/B350); for as part of the physical mechanism as nature, -they do not judge at all. the synthesis of the manifold through imagination; finally (3) the unity of this synthesis through original apperception.‖ The first step is entirely physical, for as we have seen the a priori forms (space and time) arise out of our body's encounter with the world around it. The second step argues that our bodily sensations must be weaved together in such a way that we form images of them; nothing in Kant's text prevents us from seeing this as something that the brain does. In the second edition Kant distinguishes between two aspects of this second step: the -productive‖ and the -reproductive‖ imagination. The purpose of this distinction is to point out that our mind-brain processes these sensation-based images in two very different ways: first by producing them;
second by re-producing them, in the form of what we normally call -memory‖. Neuroscience has provided us with strong evidence that the brain has a great deal to do with both processes.
The third step will be the basis, toward the end of this essay, for a challenge I will pose to EM.
The synthesis of bodily sensations to produce images, that in turn form the content of our memory, does not suffice to produce knowledge of objects all on its own. For that, we must bring this synthesis to a -unity‖, a requirement that is fulfilled by a power Kant calls -apperception‖-i.e., a metaphorical -perception‖ of one's self as a knowing subject. That Kant associates this power with our sense of -I‖, even employing Descartes' term, -ego‖, is one of the primary reasons so many readers merely assume he is adopting Cartesian dualist. But this common way of reading Kant's theory of apperception ignores the fact that, from its first introduction and throughout Kant's theoretical system, the kind of apperception Kant defends is transcendental. By calling this -I‖ the transcendental ego, Kant means to imply that there is nothing substantial about it; that is, it does not exist in space and time, so it is not a mental or -soulish‖ correlate to our physical existence. Like every a priori element of his theoretical system, the transcendental ego is ideal; this means that, as far as our physical existence is concerned, its status is that of a necessary Interestingly, one inference that Kant himself drew from his theory of the empirical ego, for which he has often been criticized, actually renders his position more amenable to EM: Kant denied that empirical psychology could ever become a science. 26 Believing he had destroyed the foundation for a science of rational psychology by refuting Descartes' notion of a substantial soul, Kant assumed that the only thing left for empirical psychology to research would be the contents of human introspection, which could not, as such, ever be accessible to external observation, as is required for a science to be empirical. As we have seen, the primary claim of EM is that folk psychology is a theory (i.e., an attempt to regard desires and beliefs as scientifically justifiable explanations of human behavior) that is weak and unreliable, and that it will therefore probably end up being replaced some day by a complex, neurologically-based account of why we do what we do. For my purposes here, it will suffice merely to express an opinion: Kant's rationale for predicting that psychology would never establish itself as an empirical science is compatible with, Kant's main point was that introspection cannot be the basis for a reliable empirical psychology, for the very reason that it suffers from all the contingencies of any spatio-temporal experience, but (on its own) lacks the external manifestation that enables scientists to test and verify it using objective methods. I shall comment further on this point, below.
if not identical to, EM's prediction that folk psychology will eventually be reduced to neuroscience.
Backtracking from the Dialectic in the text of the first Critique, we find in the text of the first
Critique that several other key aspects of Kant's theoretical system are explicitly body-based. 27 Of these, by far the most explicit comes toward the end of the Analytic of Principles, in the section called the Refutation of Idealism. Kant there argues that our self-awareness arises first and foremost out of our bodily experiences, and that our awareness of having a mental life arises only as an offshoot from this physical grounding. Kant added this section in the second edition in order to refute early interpreters who had mistakenly identified his transcendental idealism with Berkeley's empirical idealism. According to the latter, the very existence of the physical world can be called into question, because we have intimate knowledge only of our own mental life.
But for Kantian idealism, exactly the opposite holds: we know the physical world most intimately, so if we wish to doubt either side of Cartesian dualism, the empirical reality of our mental life must fall by the wayside. Here Kant's position virtually foreshadows EM.
A likely objection to this way of reading Kant is that the second Critique presents the noumenal world as the basis for our moral life, and morality as the source of the meaning of human life in general, so Kant could not have countenanced EM's total reduction of the mental to the physical. A complete response to this objection would be too lengthy to be attempted here. But in a nutshell, a
Kantian defender of EM might respond that in the second chapter of the first Critique's Dialectic (in the Third Antinomy), Kant acknowledges deep problems in treating freedom as a cause within the nexus of the empirical world. Whatever Kant meant by -free will‖ in the second Critique, and by the claim that it is the one -fact‖ of practical reason, he did not mean that noumenal causality interrupts the phenomenal causality required by empirical science. Our moral convictions, however their noumenal standpoint is to be philosophically justified, do not give us license to disrupt the causal nexus that the Analytic of Principles demonstrates to be a necessary condition for empirical knowledge. Instead, Kant's justification would begin by reminding us that even the transcendental principles that enable us to explain our empirical knowledge are ideal (i.e., not empirically based), so that in this respect the phenomenal is neither more nor less securely 27 One of the most interesting of these key features, though beyond the scope of this essay to explore, is Kant's theory of the twelve categories and their schematization as -principles‖ that define the mental presuppositions we must adopt, in order to explain what we know about the physical world. Typically regarded as the most immaterial stage of Kant's entire theoretical system, this theory lies at the very core of transcendental idealism's grounding in the body, argues Svare (Body and Practice in Kant, especially chapters 9-11).
grounded than the noumenal. 28
IV. Two Challenges to Eliminative Materialism
As we conclude these reflections on Kant's body-centered approach in the first Critique, we must recall where Kant started in the first Preface, by acknowledging the inevitability of metaphysical illusions. To avoid being fooled by such illusions, Kant says we must learn to think perspectivally. This means recognizing that, when we create ideas, they can carry a heavy load of meaning from one (explanatory) perspective even though from another (physical or substantive)
perspective, the object of such ideas might not literally -exist‖. Once we grasp the perspectival nature of Kant's affirmation of the body, we can recognize that his position challenges EM in at least two ways. 29 Churchland (Neurophilosophy, p.171) reports a 1950 experiment with monkeys, whereby scientists located an area of the brain that controlled thumb movement and removed it, producing temporary paralysis of the thumb; when the monkey eventually regained thumb mobility, researchers found that the cortical tissue surrounding the initial lesion had taken over this function; researchers then removed the newly modified tissue to produce a second paralysis and the same modification of surrounding areas gradually occurred again as thumb mobility was restored. The conclusion reached by such studies, Churchland reports, was that -strict localization of function was doubtful.‖ Taking on board the foregoing Kant-inspired challenge to EM would require neuroscientists at least to consider the possibility that the monkey's thumb influenced the brain and caused its modifications, not merely the brain on its own adapting to the loss of tissue. From the transcendental perspective, it is not only the brain that controls the thumb or the thumb that controls the brain (a matter that is to be resolved by empirical research), but above and beyond both of these, I (i.e., the illusory fail to materialize. In other words, it is not and never will be the brain on its own that turns out to be smarter than it is complicated, but rather, the brain and body functioning as a creative feedback loop and thereby defining the whole person.
The second challenge relates to how EM portrays the mind or mental events, once they arise. have not yet presented a sufficiently detailed account of exactly how the argument for limiting the scope of EM should be constructed. What I have argued is that it best starts from a non-dualist standpoint that is closely affiliated with EM and that its goal should not be to overthrow EM but to moderate its overly extreme claims through perspectival reasoning. 31 This claim is unlikely to be attractive to most defenders of EM. When considering that possibility that the mind-brain relation could be analogous to the wave-particle relation in the physics of light, for example, Churchland declares (in Neurophilosophy, p.375) that in order for this analogy to hold, -it would have to turn out that mentality is somehow a fundamental property of matter, and for that there is not the smallest shred of evidence.‖ This claim is somewhat shocking, coming from someone so well-versed in the details of empirical science. For in the field of quantum physics it is almost commonplace to find such a possibility affirmed, even among the most respected physicists. To cite but one of many possible examples, Freeman J. Dyson states in his 1985 Gifford Lectures, Infinite in All Directions (New York: Harper & Row, 1988) , p.8: -Therefore, I say, speaking as a physicist, scientific materialism and religious transcendentalism are neither incompatible nor mutually exclusive. We have learned that matter is weird stuff.‖ Taking quantum mechanics into consideration will render my argument more plausible; indeed, my version of EM's prediction is that future advances in both neuroscience and quantum mechanics will enable these two disciplines to draw on each other's insights in such a way as to reveal that, at the very deepest level of the brain's operation, brain states are an expression of free-flowing energy that will turn out to be the best possible scientific explanation of what -mental‖ really means-but not in a way that would destroy the legitimacy of referring to mental states as explanatory concepts. Establishing this may not require proof that mentality exists as a fundamental property of matter, but it will require evidence that mentality exists as a fundamental perspective of matter-e.g., that quarks somehow -experience‖ freedom. For further details on how quantum mechanics can be consistent with Kant's philosophy, see my pair of articles entitled -Quantum Causality and Kantian Quarks‖, THEORIA (forthcoming).
post-reduction world all well-educated persons will realize that from the perspective of empirical science, as Kant demonstrated, all our ideas have to be regarded as illusions, even though they remain no less meaningful and no less true from the moral perspective of being human.
Taking on board these two Kant-inspired challenges would not require the rejection of any essential feature of EM. What it does require is a subtle yet profound revision of the way its reductionist aims are typically presented to the public, a turn not unworthy of being called -Copernican‖: instead of viewing neurophilosophy merely as a program for reducing the mind in general and conscious mental processes in particular to nothing but raw neuroscience and the brain functions it describes, proponents of EM must also raise neuroscience to the level of the mind. 32 Only by affirming the meaningfulness of explanatory idealism, of the sort Kant defends under the rubric of the -transcendental‖, can one consistently believe or assert that EM is true.
Eliminative materialists will then be compelled to recognize that the matter cannot be quite so monochrome as extreme physicalists typically assume. This perspectival shift does not compromise our ability to take seriously whatever empirical results the science of the future may bring our way; 33 but it will prevent us from succumbing to the Cartesian error of treating the body as a whole as something that the mind-brain somehow owns. No philosopher urges us more than Kant does that we are to be ruthlessly rigorous in giving science its proper place and in therefore being open to the results of our empirical inquiries; yet in so doing, the role of a good philosopher of science is to insure that we can encourage such a tough-minded approach without adopting background assumptions that would imply we have lost our minds altogether. 34 32 The 1999 movie, -Bicentennial Man‖, serves as an interesting thought-experiment regarding what might be involved in such a reversal of the reductionist's theoretical paradigm. In it, the lead character (a robot, played by Robin Williams) decides after about two hundred years of service to a series of human masters that he wants to become human. In so doing, he does not need to change the way his neural circuitry is constructed (because the futuristic science of his day had already made him very human-like). Rather, he must change certain illusions about what his existence entails; most notably, he must accept the reality that as a human, he must die. Only when he learns to raise such illusions (motivated by his love for another) to the level of transcendental ideas does he become human. 33 I have recently applied for a research grant to fund a joint project with Rick Wells, a computational engineer at the University of Idaho, with the goal of producing a computerized simulation of infant learning according to Kantian parameters. The assumptions of the project are compatible with those of EM, insofar as the simulated environment will not distinguish between brain states and mental states. The key to making this -Kantian‖ is to give the simulated agent not only a human-like set of neurological structures, but also a growing sense of self-awareness through perception of its whole body as a unit out of which its experience arises. 34 I would like to thank Richard Mapplebeckpalmer for introducing me to several of the sources used in this essay.
